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This draft: April 19, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the intraday effects on market quality of a unique trading suspension 
mechanism in place at the Italian stock market (Borsa Italiana) in case of price limit hit.  
Specifically, when prices hit the limit, Borsa Italiana halts trading for 5 minutes ('freeze 
phase') and removes the order that caused the limit to be hit.  If trading regularly resumes 
after the freeze phase, exchange officials make no other intervention and we call this 
sequence of events 'Type 1' halt (i.e., freeze-only halt).  Alternatively, if a second limit hit 
occurs after the freeze phase, an intraday call auction replaces the continuous trading. We 
name this sequence 'Type 2' halt (i.e., intraday auction halt).  
We examine both the general effects of trading halts and the specific effects of Type 1 and 
Type 2 trading suspensions on three dimensions of market quality: trading activity, return 
volatility, and price discovery.  The full sample results reveal mixed evidence about the 
usefulness of price limit hit trading halts: trading volume and return volatility after the halt 
are abnormally high (trading interference hypothesis for volume and spillover hypothesis for 
volatility), whereas prices converge towards equilibrium values (cool off hypothesis for 
price discovery).  When we partition the sample by type of halt three main results arise. 
First, Type 2 halts always show larger abnormal volume measures than Type 1 and this 
indicates a greater interference on the normal trading process of Type 2 relative to Type 1 
halts. Second, Type 2 halts show lower post-halt abnormal volatility than Type 1. This 
might be explained by the difference in the way the market restarts after the halt. The call 
auction procedure associated with Type 2 allows for wider information dissemination, 
whereas the price discovery process in Type 1 trading halts takes place only through the 
tâtonnement process in continuous trading. Third, for the price discovery process, the call 
auction reopening procedure of Type 2 halts also has a stronger cool off effect relative to the 
Type 1 continuous trading.   
 
 
Keywords: price limits; trading halts; market quality; Italian stock market 
 
JEL Classification: G10; G14 
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A Two-Stage Non Discretionary Trading Suspension Mechanism: 
Effects on Market Quality 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Trading halts are non planned interruptions to the normal trading process. 
Trading halts can be classified into two main categories: discretionary and non 
discretionary (or automatic) trading halts. A halt is discretionary when the 
suspension is called by an exchange official under specific circumstances, expressly 
defined by the market rulebook. For example, in case of rumors regarding one or 
more securities an exchange official may stop trading and simultaneously request the 
issuer to provide the market with complete information. A halt is non discretionary 
when it is inevitably triggered by a specific event, regulated by a market rulebook 
provision, such as the break of a maximum price variation limit.  Trading halts 
triggered by price limit hit fall, therefore, in the second type of suspensions (i.e., non 
discretionary trading halts). 
Market authorities employ trading suspensions to limit "both potential and 
actual market disorder" (Iosco (2002)). It is believed that a suspension during 
abnormal market conditions (a 'disordered market') may prevent the degeneration of 
the market or, if the disordered conditions are already in place, may facilitate the 
restoration of orderly trading (cooling off effect). 
The main reasons given for supporting the opportunity to suspend trading 
differ between discretionary and non discretionary trading halts. For discretionary 
trading halts the reasons most frequently mentioned are related to market 
transparency, the repression of illegal trading practices, and exceptional market 
conditions (Iosco (2002)). First, in case of a firm-specific information event, a 
trading halt allows the issuer to release appropriate news, and market participants to 
assess the impact of such news on market prices. Second, the market authority can 
stop trading if he suspects that some form of fraud or manipulation is being carried 
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out,1 or the issuer fails to comply with some material listing rules.2 Third, a 
particular case of discretionary trading halt is when the market authority closes the 
whole market (i.e., trading is halted for all the securities listed). This may happen in 
very specific circumstances, as in the case of September 2001 U.S. markets four 
days closure. 
The use of non discretionary trading halts is mainly related to the objective 
of avoiding the inauspicious effects of erroneous traders conducts. By providing a 
cooling off period, trading halts allow market participants to evaluate information 
during times of panic and to trade "with less emotion" (Iosco (2002)). Moreover, 
trading suspensions also allow market authorities to take appropriate actions in order 
to ascertain the reasons of anomalous price fluctuations. Lastly, in case of orders or 
quotes erroneously entered into the system, trading halts provide market participants 
with the opportunity to correct such mistakes without material consequences. 
Trading suspensions called when the price hits a predetermined boundary are usually 
known as 'price limit hit trading halts.' 
Unanimous consensus is far from being reached, both in the academia and in 
the exchange industry, on the actual net benefits of price limit hit trading halts. 
Several papers investigate this issue and provide useful insights, but 
(understandably) no definitive answer on this point.  In the exchange industry as 
well there is no common view about the usefulness of stopping the trading process 
when the price hits a predetermined price boundary. As a matter of fact, securities 
markets with and without price limit hit trading halts coexist.  The first motivation 
for this study thus arises from the currently active debate on the actual net benefits 
of trading halts.3 
The investigation of the effects of price limit hit trading halts is particularly 
important for order driven markets, as the Italian stock market (Borsa Italiana) and 
                                                          
1 Fraud or manipulation can happen either "outside" the market (e.g., someone releases false or 
exaggerate pieces of information) or "inside" the market (e.g., a trader submits orders with size and 
timing such that other market participants are likely to be induced to trade accordingly). 
2 If the conditions that lead to the suspension persist, the market authority can deliberate the delisting 
of the firm. 
3 Kim and Yang (2004) provide a survey of studies on trading halts, and summarize the current state 
of the debate on their usefulness. 
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many others, and especially for their liquidity. In such markets liquidity comes from 
traders who submit standing limit orders and the ultimate viability of the market 
depends on the equilibrium between liquidity suppliers (limit order traders) and 
liquidity demanders (market order traders). Trading suspensions triggered by price 
limit hits favor limit order traders. As shown by Harris (1998), when price is 
dropping (increasing) quickly, traders using limit orders to buy (sell) a stock suffer 
from immediate losses when their orders execute as price continue to fall (rise). If 
price limits are in place, this will not occur and limit order traders may be more 
willing to offer liquidity under normal circumstances. 
The goal of this study is to investigate the effects of a unique two-stage 
mechanism to halt and to resume trading after a price limit hit on several dimensions 
of market quality. Borsa Italiana employs a non standard procedure to stop trading 
in case of price limit hit. Specifically, when a trader sends an order that could 
generate a transaction price that would break the preset limit for the first time, the 
market is automatically stopped for 5 minutes (we name this as 'freeze phase') and 
the order that would have broken the limit is removed. If trading regularly resumes 
after the freeze phase, we call this sequence of events 'Type 1 limit hit.' 
Alternatively, if a second limit hit occurs after the freeze phase, exchange officials 
arrange an intraday call auction to find a new equilibrium price. We name this 
sequence 'Type 2 limit hit.' In this paper we examine both the general effects of 
trading halts and the specific effects of Type 1 and Type 2 trading suspension 
mechanisms on market activity, return volatility, and price efficiency of individual 
stocks.4 
This paper differs from previous studies on price limits and trading halts in 
two ways. First, this study analyzes a two-stage non discretionary trading halt 
mechanism that works in a significantly different way relative to the price limit and 
trading halt mechanisms investigated in previous papers. Second, the empirical 
analysis is based on a new and very detailed data set. Our data set differs from 
previously used for two reasons. First, we have the official Borsa Italiana detailed 
                                                          
4 Our analysis exclusively refers to individual security halts. Market-wide trading halts, that can be 
called by Borsa Italiana in case of exceptional events or abnormally large market-wide price 
movements, are outside the scope of this paper. 
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transcript of all price limit suspensions occurred in a three-year period. Previous 
papers on price limits usually infer (with a certain degree of misrepresentation risk) 
price limit hits by using the algorithm developed by Kim and Rhee (1997). Second, 
we use intraday data to capture the immediate effects of price limit suspensions. To 
the best of our knowledge, previous papers on price limits use daily data.5 However, 
this feature does not enable to grasp the instantaneous effects of price limit hits, and 
market reactions observed in subsequent days may also possibly include other 
confounding effects. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews and 
discusses the previous research on trading halts. Section III provides regulatory and 
institutional details on the mechanics of trading halts in place on Borsa Italiana. 
Section IV develops three testable hypotheses related to the effects of trading halts 
on market quality. Section V provides a description of the data and sample 
characteristics. Section VI presents the results of the empirical analysis and Section 
VII concludes. 
                                                          
5 By contrast, several papers on trading halts employ intraday data (Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994); 
Corwin and Lipson (2000); Christie, Corwin, and Harris (2002)). 
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II.  RELATED STUDIES 
In this Section we provide a summary of selected theoretical models and 
empirical studies on trading halts.  
Supporters of trading suspensions argue that they can serve to protect market 
participants, allowing them to assess a new equilibrium price in case of an high level 
of uncertainty. Greenwald and Stein (1988) argue that when there is the risk of 
trading on the basis of uninformative prices, traders prefer to refrain from trading. 
This results in a reduction of market liquidity and, in turn, in a further reduction of 
price informativeness. In such conditions, a trading halt can be beneficial in that it 
restores investors' confidence on the fairness of market prices. In a later study 
(Greenwald and Stein (1991)) the same authors develop a model where uncertainty 
on the importance of uninformed traders drives to excess volatility during the 
continuous market phase. In this case, trading halts may be beneficial in maintaining 
the excess volatility at reasonable levels. Kodres and O'Brien (1994) claim that price 
limits help traders to share risks when some pieces of material information are 
released and, therefore, price limits dampen excess volatility. 
Detractors of trading suspensions argue that any kind of market interference 
should be restricted to the minimum and that halts impose unnecessary liquidity 
costs on market participants. The discovery of a new equilibrium price is, in their 
view, far easier and more accurate when trading is permitted rather than when it is 
suspended. In the model developed by Grundy and McNichols (1989) the revelation 
of information takes place through trading (as for the "learning-through-trading" 
process in Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994)). When trading is suspended, potential 
traders are inhibited from revealing their offer and demand schedules, and this harms 
the price discovery process. 
Moving to empirical studies, in their seminal paper Hopewell and Schwartz 
(1976) observe price adjustments abnormally large (and proportional to the duration 
of the trading suspension) over the suspension period, and an anticipatory behavior 
of stock returns prior to the suspension. They consider such a behavior consistent 
with a very rapid adjustment to new equilibrium prices. Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989) 
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find a positive contribution to market stabilization of price limits on futures 
contracts in that, after a price limit hit, prices tend to stabilize (or even to reverse), 
return volatility declines and volumes have a tendency to remain stable. Lauterbach 
and Ben-Zion (1993), studying the performance of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
during the October 1987 market crash, find that the implementation of trading halts 
in the form of circuit breakers had no net impact on the overall (negative) return, but 
smoothed the fluctuations and contributed to reduce the supply imbalance. Their 
evidence shows that circuit breakers served to hedge against execution price 
surprises. 
Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994) find that trading halts at the NYSE do not 
reduce either volume nor price volatility, but merely interfere with the normal 
trading activity (i.e., trading interference hypothesis): the period immediately 
following a trading halt shows higher levels of both volume and price volatility. 
They argue that the reason for the documented market behavior is that the price 
discovery process of the batch reopening mechanism employed at the NYSE is less 
efficient than the price discovery process of the continuous trading.  Specifically, 
they find that the reopening price is noisy, and consequently that it is 
counterproductive to stop trading. This leaves open the question whether the halt is 
inefficient, or the reopening mechanism is not appropriate, or both. 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) study the order flow pattern around NYSE trading 
halts. Their main hypothesis is that, if traders have the opportunity to cancel orders 
in case of extreme market conditions (thanks to trading halts), they are more willing 
to submit limit orders during normal market conditions. Corwin and Lipson find that 
limit order cancellation and submission is exceptionally high during halts and 
remains high for many hours after the halt. A second important finding is that the 
order book depth is very thin near the best quotes before, during and after the halts. 
This implies lower market liquidity around trading halts.  
A final noisy effect of price limits is the so called 'magnet effect' that is 
observed when prices show a tendency to accelerate toward the bounds as these 
approach (Arak and Cook (1997); Cho, Russel, Tiao, and Tsay (2003)). This effect 
is originated by two, concurring factors: the trading behavior induced by fear of 
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market illiquidity, and the specific trading strategies employed by market 
participants in periods of market stress. The first factor induces traders to trade more 
actively than during normal market condition when there is a risk of being closed 
out of the market as a consequence of a trading suspension. This in turn increases 
price variability and, thus, the probability of hitting the limit (Subrahmanyam 
(1994)). The second factor is behavioral and relates to the fact that investors who 
follow price trends may step in the market when prices break certain thresholds.  
Again, this category of traders may anticipate their trades if they are afraid of being 
closed out of a trend (Arak and Cook (1997)). Cho, Russel, Tiao, and Tsay (2003) 
study the Taiwan Stock Exchange price limit mechanism and find a clearly 
documented effect in the movement toward the upper limit, while the effect is less 
clear when the movement is toward the lower limit. 
The existing literature does not provide conclusive results on the 
performance of trading halts. We believe the main reasons for this are  two. First, 
there is a very widespread and heterogeneous array of institutional settings 
concerning trading halts and price limits, with reference to what happens when an 
abnormal change in contract prices is observed (the trigger event), how trading is 
resumed after a suspension, the duration of the suspension and so on. Moreover 
trading suspensions have different meanings and non homogeneous consequences in 
order driven and quote driven markets,6 and in floor-based or screen-based markets.7 
Second, a conclusive result on the desirability of trading suspension mechanisms 
could be obtained only if it were possible to contrast the performance of the same 
market with and without suspension, which is clearly impossible. 
 
                                                          
6 In quote driven markets trading suspensions protect market makers, while in order driven markets 
they mainly protect limit order traders.  It is clear that they both are liquidity providers, but they are 
made by possibly different categories of traders: market makers are only professional traders, limit 
order traders may also be retail investors. 
7 As far as trading suspensions are meant to allow market participants to completely exchange the 
available information during times of market disorder, one should observe different institutional 
settings in case of different information transmission technologies (i.e., the halts should in principle 
be shorter and triggered by wider limits in case of electronic markets than in case of physical 
markets). 
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III.  TRADING SUSPENSIONS IN THE ITALIAN STOCK MARKET  
Trading on Borsa Italiana takes place through a totally electronic screen-
based system. The system supports two trading mechanisms: a call auction used to 
open and close trading, and a continuous auction operating throughout the trading 
day.8 An electronic limit order book supports the system in both phases and allows 
the completion of trades by automatically matching buy and sell (limit and market) 
orders. The book is open to all intermediaries either to observe the state of the book 
(price and quantity for all orders on both sides), or to enter orders into the system. 
Under particular market conditions, Borsa Italiana may alter the ordinary 
operation of the trading process with different measures: 9 prolonging or delaying the 
start of one or more phases (e.g., stock X opens at 10:00 a.m.); interrupting the 
continuous phase and simultaneously activating a call auction; suspending and 
reactivating trading. 
A particular market condition occurs, under Borsa Italiana Rules (article 
4.10.2), with reference to spot markets, when: a price variation boundary is 
exceeded (i.e., a price limit hit), prices or volumes of trading can be deemed as 
anomalous (i.e., anomalous trading conditions), it is necessary to obtain information 
on a particular market situation concerning a financial instrument or the issuer (also 
known as news pending halt), technical reasons or other circumstances are such that 
the regular operation of the market cannot be guaranteed (also known as technical 
halt). In this study we focus on price limit hit trading halts.  
The limit hit suspension mechanism on the Italian market unfolds in a 
sequence of possibly two steps: a freeze phase and an intraday reopening call 
auction. The call auction occurrence is conditional upon the outcome of the freeze 
phase. As for the first step, during the continuous market, trading is immediately and 
                                                          
8 The opening phase takes place at different times depending on the market segment: for the blue-
chip segment, for example, the opening call auction unfolds between 8:00 and 9:15 and the closing 
call auction between 17:25 and 17:35. The continuous market phase, for blue-chip stocks, takes place 
between 9:30 and 17:25.  
9 In this paper we look at price limits in place on the MTA ("Mercato Telematico Azionario") 
segment of Borsa Italiana, which is the main market segment for trading Italian stocks. For other 
market segments, Borsa Italiana follows basically the same rules, the only change is in the price 
variation limit, that differs according to the type of security. 
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automatically interrupted for a period of 5 minutes (this is the 'freeze phase') when 
an order that would make a price change larger than 10% relative to the control 
price10 arrives on the market. The order that would have made the price to exceed 
the limit is cancelled and the market restarts with the continuous phase, based on the 
same orders standing on the book as at the halt but the one that triggered it. During 
the freeze phase traders are not allowed neither to modify (or cancel) previously 
posted orders, nor to post new orders. 
When trading resumes after the freeze phase, two possible states of nature 
may arise: the market works regularly or a second price limit hit occurs. In the latter 
case, the market is again suspended for 25 minutes and Borsa Italiana announces a 
new call market phase lasting 5 minutes that will end before the expiration of the 25 
minutes delay. The intraday reopening call auction follows the same rules as the 
ordinary opening or closing auctions and therefore market participants may post new 
orders, cancel or modify previously posted orders; they can also observe the value of 
a provisional opening price.11 The orders standing on the limit order book when the 
halt is declared are automatically transferred to the new opening call auction phase.12  
 
                                                          
10 The control price is the opening auction price or, if an opening auction price has not been 
determined, the previous day closing auction price. 
11 The opening (market clearing) price in the Borsa Italiana call auction is established on the basis of 
the following hierarchical rules: a) it is the price at which the largest quantity of stocks can be traded; 
b) if where the largest tradable quantity can be traded at more than one price, the opening price is the 
one which produces the smallest imbalance between buy and sell unexecuted orders; c) if neither a) 
nor b) are decisive, the opening price is the one which is closest to the last official price; d) finally 
where applying rule c) results in two prices equidistant from the last official price, the opening price 
is equal to the higher of the two. 
12 Orders not fulfilled at the end of the intraday call auction are automatically transferred to the 
continuous market session that follows. 
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IV.  TESTABLE HYPOTHESES  
 
A.  Effects on market activity 
Trading halts triggered by price limit hits, as any other trading suspension, by 
definition impede trading to take place. If price limit hits trigger the halt when 
trading is not going to occur, then market activity after the suspension should not be 
different from that occurred before the price limit was hit. However, if trading is 
equally distributed over time this is not going to be the case. When the market 
resumes after a price limit hit suspension, the trading volume will be higher to 
compensate for the period of market artificial closure.  
This hypothesis is empirically testable as follows: 
 
H0: Trading volume in the post limit hit period of a trading halt day is as 
high as in a normal trading day. 
 
H1: Trading volume in the post limit hit period of a trading halt day is higher 
than in a normal trading day. 
 
 
B.  Effects on return volatility 
One of the aims of price limits is to reduce stock returns volatility. First, 
price limits literally establish boundaries for the price change within a trading day. 
Second, they provide time to reassess information during times of market stress 
(cooling off period). However, along the same lines as the trading interference 
hypothesis, price limits prevent immediate price corrections to take place. For 
example, consider when the new equilibrium price is out of the boundaries 
established by the price limits. The absence of transactions may also exacerbate 
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information uncertainty13 and cause an increase in return volatility in the post limit 
hit period when trading resumes.  
This hypothesis is empirically testable as follows: 
 
H0: Return volatility in the post limit hit period of a trading halt day is lower 
than in the pre limit hit period.  
 
H1: Return volatility in the post limit hit period of a trading halt day is 
higher than or equal to return volatility in the pre limit hit period.  
 
 
C.  Effects on price discovery 
Proponents argue that trading halts allow investors time to react to material 
news event and allow market participants to search for the new equilibrium price. 
Goldman and Sosin (1979) suggest that policies such as price limits may improve 
market efficiency if there is sufficient price uncertainty, by reducing transitory 
deviations from fundamentals. On the other hand, detractors argue that price limits 
and trading halts are unnecessary barriers to trading. Since trading stops when limit 
hits occur, price limits truly represent upper and lower bounds on stock prices. Thus, 
price limits interfere with the price discovery process. If price limits prevent prices 
to reach their equilibrium value on the limit hit day, then stocks have to wait until 
the next trading period to reach the new equilibrium price. As a result, in subsequent 
trading rounds, the price will continue to move in the direction of the new 
equilibrium value (price continuation). Thus, by comparing the return for the pre-
halt period with the return for the post-halt period we can identify price reversal or 
price continuation patterns:14 the delayed price discovery hypothesis is supported by 
a pattern of price continuations after the halt, while it is rejected by the observation 
of a pattern of price reversals. The outcome depends on the source of the order 
                                                          
13 Brown and Jennings (1989) suggest that information will not be as readily revealed during a 
suspension as through continuous trading. 
14 We define a pattern of pre and post-halt prices as a continuation (reversal) if the sign of the pre-
halt return is (not) the same as the sign of the post-halt return; we define a pattern as "other 
possibilities" if the pre-halt and/or the post-halt return is zero. 
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imbalance that makes the price to hit the limit. If the order imbalance comes from 
informed traders, trading halts merely postpone the price adjustment and are to be 
considered harmful. Conversely, if the order imbalance comes from uninformed 
traders, trading halts provide the opportunity to attract the order flow on the opposite 
side of the market, dampening transitory volatility. In short, trading halts alter the 
price discovery process; whether this is beneficial or harmful is an empirical matter. 
This hypothesis is empirically testable as follows: 
 
H0: The proportion of price reversals after a trading halt is lower than 
normal. 
 
H1: The proportion of price reversals after a trading halt is higher than 
normal. 
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V.  DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A.  Data Description  
We identify our sample by merging two data sets provided by Borsa Italiana. 
First, the transcript of all non discretionary trading halts (NDTHs) occurred on the 
MTA segment of the Italian stock market between September 8, 2000 and 
September 24, 2003.15 Second, a time stamped record of all intraday price and 
quantity occurred in the 21 days event window (-10,+10 days) around the halt day.16  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. All limit hit trading 
halts occurred on Borsa Italiana in the period from September 8, 2000 to September 
24, 2003 amount to 26,051 (about 34 per trading day).  Type 1 (2) limit hits 
represent about 56% (44%) of the sample. Partitioning the sample by day of the 
week, an almost monotonically decreasing number of limit hits arise as the week 
progresses: the highest number of hits occurs on Mondays, the lowest on Fridays. 
The proportion of Type 1 and Type 2 halts is approximately constant across days of 
the week. 
Table 2 shows the duration of trading suspension for Type 2 limit hits. We 
classify a Type 2 trading halt as 'standard' when, after the first freeze phase (lasting 5 
minutes) triggered by a price limit hit, there is a second price limit hit occurring at 
the tentative restart of the continuous phase and the market reopens with a call 
auction after a pre-opening phase. During the pre-opening phase, the ordinary rules 
for the opening auction clearing price apply. Thus, it may happen that the opening is 
delayed (i.e., the pre-opening is prolonged) when the tentative opening price exceeds 
the limits set by Borsa Italiana. In such cases, we define a Type 2 with 'n pre-
opening phases' trading halt. In special cases, Borsa Italiana may switch the market 
to the pre-opening phase immediately after a price limit hit (that is without the 
tentative restart of continuous trading). In this special case we define a Type 2 
'without freeze phase' trading halt. About 80% of the Type 2 trading halts belongs to 
                                                          
15 This file was provided by the Market Supervision Department at Borsa Italiana. 
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the standard category, 6% to the Type 2 with 2 re-opening phases, 3% to the Type 2 
with 3 re-opening phases, 4% to the Type 2 without freeze phase. 
To work with a manageable amount of data, the intraday analysis refers to a 
randomly selected sub-sample of 300 firm-event observations. Because we analyze 
trading activity and other market quality variables before and after the halts, delayed 
openings are not considered. For similar reasons, we also exclude halts that were not 
resolved within one trading day. Our final sample includes 217 trading halts. 
 
 
B.  Methodology  
We follow the methodology first introduced by Lee, Ready, and Seguin 
(1994), and then adopted by Corwin and Lipson (2000) and by Christie, Corwin, and 
Harris (2002), to investigate the intraday effects of NYSE and Nasdaq trading halts.  
The Lee, Ready, and Seguin's methodology is based on the detection of 
abnormal values of the variable under investigation. Under this framework, the 
effect of a trading halt is measured by comparing intraday statistics for a stock 
experiencing a halt event with the same statistics computed for the same stock in a 
normal (i.e., non-halt) trading day. We consider a normal trading day as the average 
non-halt day, where the average is calculated with reference to the data observed 10 
days before and 10 days after the halt day (the non-halt period). This procedure 
controls for security characteristics that may affect the variables under investigation. 
To look at intraday effects, we partitioned the halt day (as well as non-halt 
days) in thirty-minute intervals, which are measured backward from the beginning 
of the halt to the open of trading for pre-halt periods and forward from the resuming 
of the trading activity to the end of the trading day for post-halt periods. We provide 
results for 3 hours prior (6 thirty-minute intervals) the halt and 3 hours after (6 
thirty-minute intervals) the halt. Time-of-the-day effects in the variables that we 
                                                                                                                                         
16 This file was provided by the Research & Development Department at Borsa Italiana. 
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analyze (e.g., the U-shaped pattern in trading activity) are accounted for by exactly 
matching identical time periods for halt and non-halt days.  
For example, an abnormal measure of trading activity ( 1ATA ), for firm i and 
intraday sub-period t, is computed as follows: 
( )
( ) ti
titi
ti tradesofmeandaysnonhalt
tradesofmeandaysnonhalttradesof
ATA
,
,,
,   #   
  #     #
1
−=  
 
]1[  
where # of tradesi,t is the total number of transactions occurred in the 30-
minute interval denoted by t for stock i. Thirty-minute intervals run from –6 to +6, 
where 0 is the halt period. 
Statistics of anomaly for the variable under investigation are computed 
according to equation [1] for each firm-event observation (i.e., a trading halt) and for 
each intraday sub-period. This indicator is then averaged across all firm-event 
observations and further partitioned by halt type. 
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VI.  RESULTS  
We first investigate the effects of trading halts on market activity to test the 
trading interference hypothesis stated in Section IV.A. We consider three measures 
of trading activity: the number of shares traded, the monetary value of trading, and 
the number of trades. For each of the three metrics of trading activity we computed 
the measure of anomaly defined as in [1] to compare trading activity around the 
limit hit trading halt with ordinary trading activity during non-halt periods. Table 3 
shows the summary statistics of the three measures on a 6-hour interval around the 
halt for each market suspension event in our sample. 
Full sample analysis reveals that the trading activity is higher than normal 
both before and after the halt. This result is consistent across all the trading activity 
measures we considered. Halt days are thus characterized by an abnormally higher 
trading pressure both before and after the halt. Measures of anomalous trading 
activity increase as the halt time approaches and decreases, but remain significantly 
higher, for the half-hour intervals more distant from the halt (Figure 1). In other 
words, the difference between halt days and non-halt days tends to decay as one 
departs in both directions from the halt time, but it remains significantly positive 
during the entire intraday period under investigation (ranging up to 12 half-hour 
periods around the halt). 
The median abnormal volume measures, displayed in Figure 2, show a 
relatively different pattern for the following features: the highest measure of 
anomaly is detected in the thirty-minute interval preceding the halt, the size of the 
median anomaly is always far lower than the average anomaly, and the degree of 
abnormality declines more rapidly for the time intervals more distant from the halt. 
The strongly positive difference between mean and median suggests that a small 
number of very sizable deviations from normality occurs. This may be due to the 
very low level of activity of some stocks in our sample during the non-halt days used 
as a benchmark in the computation of the abnormal measure of trading activity. The 
normally thin market in these stocks may thus lead to huge increases – in relative 
terms – in trading activity.  
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The abnormally high trading activity after the halt may be explained by 
traders' demand for immediacy. If price limits prevent trading, then the lack of 
trades implied by a trading halt may cause intensified trading activity in subsequent 
trading rounds (i.e., intraday sub-periods).  Lehmann (1989) distinguishes between 
patient traders and impatient traders. When the market reopens after a trading halt, 
impatient traders will buy or sell (at unfair prices if prices have not yet reached their 
equilibrium level, at fair prices if prices have reached their equilibrium level), and 
patient traders (who waited for prices to reach their equilibrium level) might trade at 
the new equilibrium price if this is convenient for them. In both cases, this implies 
that trading activity will be higher in sub-periods following the limit-hit sub-period, 
regardless of the actual effects of trading halt on the price discovery process. 
The abnormally high trading activity before the halt can be driven by 
information motivated trading in case the price variation that would trigger the 
trading halt is information driven, and also by a sort of magnet effect (Arak and 
Cook (1997)) as market participants tend to anticipate their trades by fear of being 
crowded out by the declaration of the halt. 
When we partition the sample according to the halt type (Table 3, panel B 
and Figure 3), we find that the abnormal volume statistics are consistently higher, in 
most sub-periods, for Type 2 trading halts than for Type 1 trading halts. We also 
find for Type 2 trading halts evidence of a statistically significant abnormally high 
volume measures following the halts. This implies that they prevent rational market 
participants to voluntarily trade and partially supports the trading interference 
hypothesis. This hypothesis is indirectly supported also by the differences in 
abnormal volumes observed for Type 1 and Type 2 halts: Type 1 halts – where the 
market closure is shorter than in the case of Type 2 halts – are quickly resolved, and 
trading activity responds to the lower interference of Type 1 halts showing a smaller 
deviation from a normal trading day.  
The second step of our analysis is the investigation of the effects of trading 
suspensions on return volatility. Market regulators expect that stopping the trading 
process when price variations exceed some pre-specified limit can help to reduce 
'excessive' stock return volatility and to prevent panic behavior. However, the effects 
 19
on return volatility may be temporary in that trading halts might prevent immediate 
price corrections to take place and so simply delay the prompt attainment of a new 
equilibrium price. When the market reopens, return volatility will be again higher 
than normal due to the price discovery process still taking place. Therefore, return 
volatility might even increase when trading resumes. 
We test the null hypothesis that return volatility in the post limit hit period is 
lower than in the pre limit hit period against the alternative hypothesis that the return 
volatility in the post limit hit period is higher than or equal to return volatility in the 
pre limit hit period (volatility spillover hypothesis according to Kim and Rhee 
(1997)). Our results (Table 4 and Figure 4) show that the intraday abnormal 
volatility around trading halts is higher after the halt. The average abnormal 
volatility in the post-halt periods is always positive, statistically significant and 
higher than in the pre-halt period. When we use the median as a measure of central 
tendency, the pattern of abnormal volatility is qualitatively the same, while the 
magnitude of the abnormality is lower. We find a pattern of almost monotonically 
declining abnormal volatility measures in the periods following the halt. The 
hypothesis that the return volatility in the post-halt period is lower than in the pre-
halt period can be safely rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis (volatility 
spillover). Moreover, volatility tends to increase in the half-hour period immediately 
before the halt and this is consistent with a magnet effect hypothesis. 
Our results are consistent with Lehmann (1989) who suggests that order 
imbalance between patient and impatient traders influences the likelihood of hitting 
price limits and price volatility. In fact, rather than reducing volatility, price limits 
may cause volatility to spread out over a longer period of time because limits 
prevent large one-time price changes and prevent immediate corrections in order 
imbalance. This spillover of trades to subsequent trading rounds and the search for a 
new equilibrium price after the halt is consistent with the volatility spillover 
hypothesis. Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994) find increased trading volume and 
volatility on days following trading halts. As well known (Karpoff (1987)), volume 
and volatility are positively correlated. This may also explain why we find an 
increase in both variables. 
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When we distinguish between Type 1 and Type 2 halts (Table 4, panel B and 
Figure 5), we find similar results: volatility unusually increases during the post-halt 
periods for both Type 1 and Type 2 halts. However, we find interesting differences 
in the magnitude of the abnormality measure between Type 1 and Type 2 halts: in 
the first post-halt period, the abnormal volatility for Type 1 halts is more than twice 
the corresponding abnormal volatility for Type 2 halts and the measure of 
abnormality is statistically significant in both cases. Similar conclusions can be 
drawn when looking at the median. Type 1 halts show a significant increase in 
volatility during the 2 periods just before the halt, while Type 2 halts exhibit an 
abnormal increase in volatility only in the period immediately preceding the halt.  
The difference in abnormal volatility in the first post-halt period can be 
explained by the different reopening procedures employed for Type 1 and Type 2 
halts: the call auction associated with Type 2 halts smoothes volatility more than the 
restart of the market via continuous auction as with Type 1 halts. This evidence 
relates to the different price discovery mechanisms: tâtonnement process via 
continuous trading for Type 1 and market clearing auction for Type 2. The call 
auction seems to be more appropriate for absorbing the order imbalance that 
normally occur when trading is halted. By contrast, Type 1 halts need more time to 
process the order imbalance (and the abnormal trading activity), and this reflects in a 
greater abnormal volatility especially in the half-hour just after the suspension. 
Given that the tâtonnement process implied with continuous trading takes place 
through real trades, the price discovery process for Type 1 halts is much more costly 
than that for Type 2 (based on an intraday call auction). 
Finally we focus our analysis on the effects of price limit hit trading halts on 
market efficiency. Here the competing hypotheses are that the suspension of the 
trading process can give market participants the time to assess new material pieces 
of information regarding the suspended stock,17 whereas – on the other hand – a halt 
in the trading process may prevent securities prices to attain more quickly their new 
                                                          
17 This is particularly true in case of severe adverse selection problems. In such cases, to avoid 
unexpected execution prices, market participants immediately abstain from trading, causing a sudden 
drop in liquidity. If market participants are given a cooling off period to reassess the information set, 
 21
equilibrium values (delayed price discovery hypothesis). We test these competing 
hypotheses (stated in Section IV.C) by comparing post-halt returns with pre-halt 
returns. Evidence of a predominance of price continuation (that is, the halt interferes 
with the incorporation of information into prices) would support the delayed price 
discovery hypothesis, while evidence of price reversal could signal the correction of 
an over-reactive behavior of market participants and thus would support the cool off 
hypothesis.  
We define price continuations when the sign of the post-halt return is the 
same as the one of the pre-halt return and price reversals when the signs of pre and 
post-halt returns are the opposite. Specifically, we define as price continuations the 
following returns series: [+,+] and [-,-], where the first (second) sign in parenthesis 
indicates the sign of the return in the pre(post)-halt period.  Similarly, we define as 
price reversals the following returns series: [+,-] and [-,+].  The remaining five 
combinations – where at least one return is zero – are defined as 'other possibilities'. 
Table 5 and Figures 6 and 7 show our results. On non-halt days, the frequency of 
price continuation is approximately equal to the frequency of price reversal. 
Interestingly, on halt days the frequency of price continuation is far lower than the 
frequency of price reversal. This evidence supports the cool off hypothesis since it 
indicates that the market was over-reacting prior to the halt. When partitioning the 
sample according to the halt type, we find an even larger difference between price 
reversals and continuation for Type 2 trading halts relative to Type 1. As earlier, this 
difference may be driven by the difference in the reopening mechanism. This 
implies that the call auction procedure associated with Type 2 facilitates the cool off 
of the market.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
they can redesign their trading strategies and submit orders to the market. The reduction of the degree 
of informational asymmetry facilitates the emergence of a new equilibrium price. 
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VII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the intraday effects of non discretionary trading halts 
triggered by price limit hits on volume, volatility, and price discovery by comparing 
statistics computed on a 30-minute basis on the halt day with the same statistics 
computed for the same stocks in normal trading sessions (non-halt days). 
The full sample results reveal mixed evidence about the usefulness of price 
limit hit trading halts. Consistently with previous studies on trading halts, we find 
unusually higher levels of both volume and volatility after the halt (Lee, Ready, and 
Seguin (1994), Corwin and Lipson (2002), Christie, Corwin, and Harris (2002)). 
Differently from previous studies, we find abnormally higher levels of volume prior 
to the halt. We find strong support for the trading interference hypothesis: both pre-
halt and post-halt market behavior is unusual in halt days compared with non-halt 
days. The abnormal volatility in the post-halt periods is always positive and 
statistically significant, and higher than in the pre-halt period. This evidence 
supports the volatility spillover hypothesis. The abnormal positive volatility in the 
half-hour interval before the halt is also consistent with a magnet effect hypothesis. 
The pattern of price continuations and reversals around trading halts supports the 
cool off hypothesis in that prices tend to over-react before the halt and to revert to 
their equilibrium values after the halt. 
The institutional setting of Borsa Italiana allows us to disentangle the effects 
of the trading halt itself from the effects of the way in which trading is resumed after 
the halt. Type 1 trading halts resume trading with a continuous market, while Type 2 
trading halts employs a call auction to restart trading after the suspension. Three 
main results arise.  First, Type 2 halts always show larger abnormal volume 
measures than Type 1 and this indicates a greater interference on the normal trading 
process of Type 2 relative to Type 1 halts.  Second, Type 2 halts show lower post-
halt abnormal volatility than Type 1. This might be explained by the difference in 
the way the market restarts after the halt. The call auction procedure associated with 
Type 2 allows for wider information dissemination, whereas the price discovery 
process in Type 1 trading halts takes place only through the tâtonnement  process in 
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continuous trading.  Third, the call auction reopening procedure of Type 2 halts also 
has a stronger cool off effect relative to Type 1 also for the price discovery process. 
Halting the trading process does not completely fulfill the purpose of cooling 
off the market in extreme volatility conditions. However, this does not mean that 
trading halts are harmful or useless. Trading halts may serve other purposes than 
cooling off only. They can reduce the amount of disequilibrium that would take 
place during large price adjustments or compensate liquidity providers (limit order 
traders) for the losses they suffer in case of extreme price movements. Limit order 
traders will be in fact more willing to submit limit orders (and thus to supply 
liquidity) if they anticipate that the market will be stopped (and so they will have the 
chance to revise their limit orders) in case of major price moves, potentially harmful 
for them. Thus, even if trading halts may not positively alter the quality of the 
market when a halt is called, they may be beneficial in improving the liquidity 
during non-halt periods.  
Previous studies have shown that anticipated market closures (e.g., end of 
session or weekend) are associated with typical patterns in various measures of 
market performance: bid-ask spread, stock returns, volatility and volume. Typically, 
measures of intraday returns, volatility and volume show U-shaped patterns that can 
be interpreted based on the strategies of different classes of traders as, e.g., in 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).  Models that explain intraday patterns can also help to 
explain the differences we found between Type 1 and Type 2 halts. Unlikely 
ordinary market closures, neither Type 1 nor Type 2 halts are foreseeable. However, 
Type 2 halts call for a reopening that is foreseeable (in the short time span of 25 
minutes). The reopening procedure of Type 2 halts might thus introduce trading 
patterns not due to the halt process itself or to its causes, but merely to the event that 
the market closes and then reopens. This fact provides market participants with an 
additional coordination mechanism (the delay) and implies a switch to a different 
pricing rule (from a discriminatory to a uniform pricing rule). Both these factors can 
affect traders' order submission strategies and the equilibrium between liquidity 
demanders and liquidity providers.  
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# obs. % # obs. % # obs. % # obs. % # obs. % # obs. %
Type 1 # obs. 3,338 12.81 2,960 11.36 2,941 11.29 2,831 10.87 2,558 9.82 14,628 100.00
% 55.61 56.11 54.91 56.45 58.11 56.15
Type 2 # obs. 2,665 10.23 2,315 8.89 2,415 9.27 2,184 8.38 1,844 7.08 11,423 100.00
% 44.39 43.89 45.09 43.55 41.89 43.85
Total 6,003 23.04 5,275 20.25 5,356 20.56 5,015 19.25 4,402 16.90 26,051 100.00
Friday Total
This table presents the frequency of Type 1 and Type 2 non discretionary trading halts by day of the week for the full sample. We classify a trading
halt as Type 1 when, after a price limit hit and the following freeze of the market, trading resumes regularly with the continuous market. A trading
halt is classified as Type 2 when, after a price limit hit as in Type 1, there is a second limit hit at the restart of the continuous market and trading
restarts with a call auction, preceded by a pre-opening phase.
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday
# obs. % average min median max
Type 2 standard 9082 79.51 35.28 11.85 31.02 468.50
Type 2 with 2 pre-opening phases 735 6.43 63.24 30.38 60.69 303.31
Type 2 with 3 pre-opening phases 349 3.06 94.05 88.24 90.71 214.26
Type 2 with 4 pre-opening phases 209 1.83 123.93 117.20 120.57 394.92
Type 2 with 5 pre-opening phases 122 1.07 152.74 146.31 150.57 210.25
Type 2 with 6 pre-opening phases 98 0.86 183.06 175.43 180.73 248.66
Type 2 with 7 pre-opening phases 70 0.61 212.18 204.40 210.46 265.87
Type 2 with 8 pre-opening phases 78 0.68 244.13 230.95 240.62 303.06
Type 2 with 9 pre-opening phases 72 0.63 271.84 262.27 270.47 320.46
Type 2 with 10 pre-opening phases 49 0.43 302.56 291.32 300.61 369.74
Type 2 with 11 pre-opening phases 36 0.32 329.62 318.09 330.66 343.61
Type 2 with 12 pre-opening phases 27 0.24 362.79 349.23 360.75 409.79
Type 2 with 13 pre-opening phases 29 0.25 391.59 378.31 390.59 439.22
Type 2 with 14 pre-opening phases 27 0.24 420.77 407.21 420.57 434.64
Type 2 with 15 pre-opening phases 29 0.25 451.27 436.32 451.09 473.50
Type 2 with 16 pre-opening phases 10 0.09 473.69 465.26 473.62 483.64
Type 2 with 17 pre-opening phases 1 0.01 449.33 449.33 449.33 449.33
Type 2 without freeze phase 400 3.50 24.62 5.23 25.14 388.84
Table 2 - Duration of Trading Halts
This table presents the duration of the trading suspension in case of Type 2 trading halts for the full
sample. We classify a Type 2 trading halt as "standard" when, after the first freeze phase (lasting 5
minutes) triggered by a price limit hit, there is a second price limit hit occurring at the tentative
restart of the continuous phase and the market reopens with a call auction after a pre-opening phase.
During the pre-opening phase, the ordinary rules for the opening clearing price apply. Thus, it may
happen that the opening is delayed (i.e., the pre-opening is prolonged) when the tentative opening
price exceeds the limits set by the ISE. In such cases, we define a Type 2 with "n pre-opening
phases" trading halt. In special cases, the ISE may switch the market to the pre-opening phase
immediately after a price limit hit (that is without the tentative restart of continuous trading). In this
special case we define a Type 2 "without freeze phase" trading halt.
Duration
Period # obs. Avg Std Dev T-Stat Median Avg Std Dev T-Stat Median Avg Std Dev T-Stat Median
Panel A: Full sample
-6 94 0.79 2.16 2.82 0.00 0.74 2.13 2.67 -0.08 0.49 1.39 2.72 0.08
-5 108 0.90 2.40 2.84 0.04 0.85 2.42 2.65 -0.07 0.57 1.35 3.17 0.08
-4 110 1.22 5.12 1.93 0.12 1.19 5.26 1.85 0.07 0.72 2.37 2.47 0.09
-3 134 0.98 3.00 2.86 -0.09 0.96 3.14 2.69 -0.16 0.75 2.08 3.17 0.00
-2 154 1.93 4.63 3.99 0.52 1.88 4.75 3.80 0.41 1.25 3.03 3.97 0.43
-1 227 3.47 5.99 7.11 1.33 3.54 6.50 6.70 1.24 2.43 3.72 8.01 1.33
During halt 28 2.50 5.96 2.05 -0.11 2.71 6.65 2.00 -0.03 1.39 3.24 2.10 0.00
+1 179 3.16 7.23 4.63 0.57 3.42 8.26 4.38 0.43 2.51 5.49 4.83 0.55
+2 137 1.99 4.32 4.01 0.41 2.03 4.46 3.96 0.25 1.36 2.53 4.69 0.44
+3 114 1.47 3.76 3.15 0.33 1.56 4.20 3.00 0.26 1.17 2.44 3.85 0.28
+4 95 1.15 2.88 3.00 0.18 1.23 3.18 2.90 0.16 0.97 2.11 3.44 0.18
+5 86 1.43 3.40 3.08 0.18 1.53 3.86 2.90 0.14 0.83 2.13 2.85 0.27
+6 80 0.76 2.71 1.99 -0.11 0.86 3.08 1.97 -0.16 0.52 1.44 2.54 0.02
Abnormal number of tradesAbnormal share volume
Table 3 - Intraday Trading Activity Around Trading Halts
Abnormal monetary  volume
This table shows summary statistics of the abnormal measures for the number of shares traded, the monetary trading volume, and the number of trades.
The abnormal measures are computed on the basis of the halt day values relative to the mean nonhalt days values. Nonhalt days include 10 days before
and 10 days after the halt. The halt period extends from the beginningof the halt to the market resuming trade. Thirty-minute prehalt periods are measured
backward from the beginning of the halt. Thirty-minute posthalt periods are measured forward from the reopening time. 
Period # obs. Avg Std Dev T-Stat Median Avg Std Dev T-Stat Median Avg Std Dev T-Stat Median
Panel B: By type of trading halt
Type 1 -6 30 0.86 2.75 1.29 -0.36 0.76 2.71 1.16 -0.34 0.03 0.93 0.12 -0.23
-5 35 -0.05 1.11 -0.18 -0.32 -0.15 0.92 -0.68 -0.39 0.08 0.87 0.38 -0.21
-4 36 0.50 1.48 1.52 0.08 0.44 1.47 1.34 -0.04 0.21 0.80 1.17 0.10
-3 43 0.36 0.90 1.85 0.33 0.28 0.83 1.54 0.25 0.31 0.82 1.75 0.28
-2 44 0.09 0.73 0.61 0.02 0.03 0.66 0.21 0.01 0.07 0.68 0.48 0.00
-1 71 1.95 3.03 4.26 1.13 1.89 2.98 4.21 0.81 1.63 2.23 4.86 0.98
During halt
+1 64 0.96 2.46 2.32 -0.04 0.97 2.55 2.26 -0.16 0.94 1.87 2.96 0.44
+2 51 2.04 5.19 2.19 0.34 2.00 5.22 2.14 0.22 1.11 2.22 2.77 0.41
+3 41 0.28 1.44 0.90 -0.07 0.25 1.39 0.82 -0.09 0.70 1.50 2.15 0.38
+4 38 0.50 1.52 1.44 0.07 0.48 1.51 1.40 0.00 0.38 1.10 1.50 0.07
+5 34 0.78 1.44 2.36 0.37 0.77 1.48 2.29 0.37 0.53 1.07 2.17 0.25
+6 32 0.11 1.07 0.46 -0.33 0.14 1.19 0.55 -0.28 0.41 1.29 1.46 -0.04
Type 2 -6 64 0.76 1.91 2.59 0.05 0.73 1.89 2.51 -0.02 0.68 1.50 2.92 0.19
-5 73 1.34 2.70 3.09 0.21 1.31 2.75 2.98 0.13 0.80 1.48 3.35 0.16
-4 74 1.53 6.06 1.71 0.15 1.52 6.21 1.66 0.11 0.94 2.77 2.31 0.07
-3 91 1.21 3.45 2.61 -0.15 1.22 3.62 2.52 -0.24 0.92 2.38 2.89 0.00
-2 110 2.54 5.19 4.06 0.66 2.50 5.34 3.89 0.68 1.65 3.39 4.04 0.50
-1 156 4.09 6.76 6.26 1.55 4.22 7.39 5.91 1.39 2.75 4.15 6.86 1.46
During halt 28 2.50 5.96 2.05 -0.11 2.71 6.65 2.00 -0.03 1.39 3.24 2.10 0.00
+1 115 4.16 8.39 4.35 0.92 4.53 9.63 4.13 0.99 3.22 6.39 4.42 0.68
+2 86 1.95 3.66 3.58 0.41 2.04 3.92 3.50 0.33 1.53 2.73 3.78 0.46
+3 73 2.04 4.37 3.09 0.51 2.19 4.91 2.96 0.53 1.39 2.77 3.32 0.28
+4 57 1.49 3.34 2.71 0.27 1.62 3.72 2.64 0.26 1.27 2.43 3.18 0.21
+5 52 1.78 4.07 2.58 0.09 1.94 4.65 2.46 0.02 0.99 2.53 2.31 0.29
+6 48 1.24 3.39 1.96 -0.06 1.38 3.86 1.92 -0.09 0.60 1.56 2.06 0.07
Abnormal share volume Abnormal monetary  volume Abnormal number of trades
Table 3 (cont.)
Period # obs. Avg Std Dev T-Stat Median
Panel A: Full sample
-6 96 0.06 0.71 0.56 -0.11
-5 108 0.13 0.82 1.15 -0.10
-4 111 0.07 0.69 0.77 -0.05
-3 136 0.01 0.53 0.19 -0.11
-2 157 0.15 0.73 1.78 -0.06
-1 231 0.67 1.42 5.38 0.19
During halt
+1 178 0.90 1.50 5.46 0.53
+2 137 0.42 1.15 2.85 0.26
+3 114 0.50 0.87 4.05 0.31
+4 96 0.52 1.06 3.17 0.30
+5 86 0.47 1.02 2.95 0.14
+6 79 0.36 1.30 3.16 0.15
This table shows summary statistics of the abnormal measure for the half-hour return
volatility. The abnormal measure is computed on the basis of the halt day values relative
to the mean nonhalt days values. Nonhalt days include 10 days before and 10 days after
the halt. The halt period extends from the beginning of the halt to the reopening trade.
Thirty-minute prehalt periods are measured backward from the beginning of the halt.
Thirty-minute posthalt periods are measured forward from the market resuming  time. 
Table 4 - Intraday Volatility Around Trading Halts
Abnormal volatility measure
Period # obs. Avg Std Dev T-Stat Median
Panel B: By type of trading halt
Type 1 -6 31 0.08 0.40 0.70 0.07
-5 35 0.01 0.48 0.08 -0.08
-4 36 0.10 0.70 0.59 0.01
-3 44 -0.04 0.59 -0.31 -0.18
-2 45 0.45 0.59 3.14 0.52
-1 73 0.72 1.35 3.18 0.36
During halt
+1 64 1.40 1.70 4.28 0.92
+2 51 0.51 1.29 2.07 0.32
+3 42 0.56 1.04 2.21 0.35
+4 38 0.84 1.21 2.69 0.54
+5 34 0.56 1.00 2.22 0.18
+6 32 0.46 1.66 2.48 0.38
Type 2 -6 65 0.05 0.79 0.36 -0.11
-5 73 0.18 0.93 1.18 -0.10
-4 75 0.06 0.70 0.53 -0.15
-3 92 0.03 0.51 0.44 -0.07
-2 112 0.06 0.74 0.65 -0.09
-1 158 0.65 1.45 4.36 0.14
During halt
+1 114 0.66 1.35 3.66 0.41
+2 86 0.34 1.04 1.93 0.25
+3 72 0.47 0.79 3.43 0.30
+4 58 0.34 0.95 1.87 0.06
+5 52 0.41 1.05 1.98 0.10
+6 47 0.39 0.98 2.03 0.04
Abnormal volatility measure
Table 4 (cont.)
Halt days
Frequency Proportion Z value Pr > |Z| Frequency Proportion Z value Pr > |Z|
Panel A: Full sample
Price continuation 46 0.21 1,836 0.42
Price reversal 64 0.29 1,750 0.40
Other possibilities 107 0.49 6.79 0.03 736 0.17 2,602.61 0.00
Total 217 1 4,322 1
Panel B: By type of trading halt
Type 1 Price continuation 13 0.19 530 0.40
Price reversal 17 0.25 536 0.40
Other possibilities 37 0.55 0.54 0.76 262 0.20 690.59 0.00
Total 67 1 1,328 1
Type 2 Price continuation 33 0.22 1,306 0.44
Price reversal 47 0.31 1,214 0.41
Other possibilities 70 0.47 7.75 0.02 474 0.16 1,920.25 0.00
Total 150 1 2,994 1
Chi-Square Test   Chi-Square Test   
This table shows the frequency of price continuations, reversals, and no change for the full sample and by type of trading halt. We apply a variation
of the Kim and Rhee (1997) algorithm. We examine the total return over the prehalt period and compare it with the posthalt return. If the sign of the
prehalt return is (not) the same as the sign of the posthalt return the event is classified as price continuation (reversal). Combinations of prehalt and
posthalt returns including zero returns are classified as 'other possibilities'. The null hypothesis for the Chi-Square test is that the proportion of
continuation is 0.2222, the proportion of reversal is 0.2222, the proportion of other possibilities is 0.5556.
Table 5 - Intraday Price Behaviour Around Trading Halts
Non-halt days
Figure 1 - Mean Abnormal Volume Measures
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Figure 2 - Median Abnormal Volume Measures
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Figure 3 - Median Abnormal Monetary Volume Partitioned by Halt Type
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Figure 4 - Abnormal Volatility Measures
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Figure 5 - Mean Abnormal Volatility Partitioned by Halt Type
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Figure 6 - Price Continuations and Price Reversals
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Figure 7 - Price Continuations and Price Reversals Partitioned by Halt Type
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